In recent years, the new political governance, a partisan model that con tributes to a permanent campaign, gained ground in public organizations. In this new context, "deliverology" is portrayed as an innovative method to help govern ments implement new policies and deliver on election promises. This article presents the similarities and diff erences that exist between "deliverology" and evaluation. Is deliverology really something new or is it another case of old wine in a new bottle? Is deliverology a substitute for or, instead, a complement to institutionalized evalu ation? To what extent does new political governance (exemplified by deliverology and performance measurement) undermine evidence-based decision making? What is the value-added of deliverology? These questions are addressed through a critical reflection on deliverology and its value-added in Canada, where evaluation became institutionalized in many departments and agencies under the influence of resultsbased management, promoted by the advocates of new public management over four decades. Résumé : Depuis quelques années, la nouvelle gouvernance politique, un modèle de gestion partisane qui contribue à une campagne permanente, gagne en faveur dans les organisations publiques. Dans ce nouveau contexte, la « résultologie » est présen tée comme une méthode innovatrice de mise en oeuvre des politiques gouvernemen tales et de suivi de la réalisation des promesses électorales. Cet article présente les points communs et les différences qui existent entre la résultologie et l' évaluation. La résultologie est-elle vraiment quelque chose de nouveau ou est-ce seulement une autre manière de réinventer la roue? La résultologie est-elle un substitut ou plutôt un complément à l' évaluation qui s' est progressivement institutionnalisée dans l' appareil d'État? Dans quelle mesure la nouvelle gouvernance politique (incarnée par la résultologie et la gestion du rendement) vient-elle miner la prise de décisions éclairées par des données probantes? Quelle est la valeur ajoutée de la résultologie? Pour répondre à ces questions, le présent article propose une réflexion critique sur la résultologie et sa valeur ajoutée au Canada, où l' évaluation s' est institutionnalisée dans les ministères et les agences sous l'influence de la tendance de gestion axée sur of Program Evaluation / La Revue canadienne d'évaluation de programme 34.2 (Fall / automne), 303-328 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.53365 304 Birch and Jacob les résultats, dont les partisans de la nouvelle gestion publique font la promotion depuis quelque 40 ans.
Although Savoie (2015) and Barber (2016) share a similar diagnosis of modern governance challenges and the need to focus on implementation (see note 1), they do not reference each other's work or even the same literature on governance. Furthermore, where Savoie criticizes new political governance and private-sector-style performance management as harmful for implementation and service delivery in the public sector, deliverology embraces both the govern ing party's reform agenda and private-sector-inspired performance management for optimal delivery, thereby becoming a tool for new political governance. Th ese observations inspire the image of two worlds, each with its own referential frame and its own conclusions, which share a vision that government should realign to deliver whatever it is good at doing for the greater good of citizens. Th e small overlap between the two worlds remains a concern for improved decision making regarding policy implementation and for better policy outcomes. One domain is the "deliverologist's" world and the other is the world of the evaluators, public administration scholars, and political scientists.
Through an overview of central ideas and criticisms of Barber's deliverology, we situate deliverology relative to ex ante, concomitant, and ex post evaluation as well as results-based management. We then explore the controversial implemen tation of deliverology in Canada. Despite their common concerns for improved policy implementation, deliverology and evaluation appear largely as two worlds with different roots and evidence standards and with some overlapping zones, notably the use of performance indicators in evaluation and the aspiration for social betterment through effective policy delivery and meaningful public-sector reform. However, there are vast zones where these worlds diverge discursively, methodologically, and philosophically.
WHAT IS BARBER'S DELIVEROLOGY?
Deliverology is a trademark created and owned by Delivery Associates, Michael Barber's consultancy firm (Delivery Associates, n.d.a). Although Barber initially spoke of an emerging science of delivery, Delivery Associates market it as follows: Deliverology® is our system for helping governments deliver meaningful results that will last. It is both a science and an art. The science is the routine of setting a target and then using data, technology, planning, monitoring and problem solving to achieve it. The art is the way you do it and how you behave-it needs focus, urgency, ambition, honesty and humility. (Delivery Associates, n.d.b) Deliverology is a global business that promotes a model of how to run a govern ment drawn from business management and its founder's practical experience in education and advising governments on delivering reforms. Barber relentlessly transformed his original practitioner experience acquired in the Blair years as head of the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit into a tool for global career mobility through partnerships and networks involving high-profile management consult ant firms such as McKinsey & Company with the McKinsey Global Institute, and the Boston Consulting Group with its Centre for Public Impact (Brown, 2015;  see also Centre for Public Impact, 2016 Impact, , 2017 , and now his own Delivery Associates. This network includes international organizations like the OECD, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum (see Global Agenda Council on Edu cation, 2016, for an example), and non-profit or philanthropic think tanks such as the Centre for American Progress and the Brookings Institute, as well as Th e Economist Intelligence Unit, the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Institute for Government, the Social Market Foundation, and NESTA, all in the United Kingdom. Deliverology is thus an example of a business in the lucrative, publicsector management reforms industry (see Manning, 2015, about this industry, and Manning & Watkins, 2013 , for a comparison of deliverology to other approaches).
The main sources of inspiration for Barber's model of delivery, as shown by his bibliographies, span an eclectic mix, including (1) his own experiences as re counted in his publications, (2) historical accounts of country success, fi xing fail ures, and trends in Western history, with works by Fukuyama, (3) biographies or autobiographies of leaders such as Winston Churchill, Theodore Roosevelt, Mar garet Thatcher, and Tony Blair, (4) various publications by governments, consul tancy groups, think tanks, and international organizations, (5) popular literature on great or successful companies, (6) accounts of delivery-unit successes in other countries such as Chile and Malaysia, and (7) books on public and private strate gies (see reference lists in Barber, 2008 Barber, , 2013 Barber, , 2016 Barber, , 2017 Barber, Donnelly, & Rizvi, 2013; Barber, Moffit, & Kihn, 2011a , 2011b . The preference for grey lit erature as opposed to peer-reviewed academic publications is summarized in the following statement: synthesis is now provided by organisations outside universities-thinktanks, public agencies or consultancies, or by those who translate the synthesis into action…. [T]he most influential reports globally in the past five years have come from the Organisa tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), McKinsey or, recently, the Economist Intelligence Unit. (Barber et al., 2013, p. 17) The academic literature in evaluation, public administration, 2 and political sci ence is remarkably absent from Barber's reference lists. Conversely, references to "deliverology" per se are rare in evaluation and policy studies, where there is a vast literature grounded in scientific inquiry and practitioners' experiences aft er four decades of institutionalization and professionalization of evaluation in Ca nadian public administration (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2013 -2014 Cummings & Gauthier, 2016; Dobell & Zussman, 2018; Jacob, 2006) . Th us, the first divergence between evaluation and deliverology is rooted in their respective sources of knowledge and inspiration.
DIVERGENT EVIDENCE STANDARDS
Flowing from this divergence is another one concerning evidence standards for policymakers. At first glance, deliverology seems at odds with discourses on bringing scientific evidence back into policy. However, Cairney and Oliver (2017 ) remind us that scientists compete with other influential actors to access policymaking audiences. They argue that these audiences face two challenges. First, policymakers operate in complex, power-sharing, multi-level governance environments. Second, given this complexity and its inherent ambiguities, policymakers act under conditions of bounded rationality and thus accept variations in evidence standards and hierarchies. Policymaking audiences can opt for evidence from implementation science, with its emphasis on gathering data on eff ective ness, with attentiveness to evidence hierarchies that value systematic reviews and randomized controlled trials (RCTs), on scaling up best practices through replica tion, and on managing dosages of the "active ingredient" for change. They can also include other social science research as well as internal and external evaluations of policies and their implementation and outcomes (Cantelli, Jacob, Genard, & de Visscher, 2006; Nilsen, Ståhl, Roback, & Cairney, 2013 ) . They can choose evidence presented through storytelling approaches about indicators of eff ectiveness from practitioners and service users, narrations of experiences in case studies, and de scriptions of key principles to be prioritized for service delivery (for an example, see Results and Delivery-Lessons From Around the World. Canada School of Pub lic Service, 2016a; see also Delivery Associates, n.d.b). In Canada, at the outset of his first mandate, Justin Trudeau, as Prime Minister of Canada, turned to Barber with his storytelling approach and more supple evidence hierarchy (see Dobell & Zussman, 2018; Puttick & Ludlow, 2013; Shepherd, 2018) instead of contracting to experts in public policy and public administration for guidance in implement ing, rather than delivering, the Liberal Party of Canada's platform. It is important to note that, for Barber, evidence that a policy is working lies in achieving a set of chosen targets set by the executive level of government, whereas for evaluators and scholars, the aspirational standards are set in light of the policy goals and require the production of valid and reliable data using scientific methods to determine the policy's relevance, eff ectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability in achieving positive intended outcomes.
IS DELIVEROLOGY A MODEL OF POLICY CHANGE OR OF PLEDGE FULFILLMENT?
Let us now turn to the core elements of deliverology as a model of policy change and implementation and as a tool for reforming public-sector management. Th is model tells policymakers at the top to begin by answering five simple questions:
(1) What are you trying to do? (2) How are you trying to do it? (3) How, at any given moment, will you know that you are on track? (4) If you are not on track, what are you going to do about it?, and (5) How can we help?, and to establish a routinized system requiring civil servants to report upwards on these same questions (Barber, 2008; Canada School of Public Service, 2016a; Murekeyisoni, 2017 ) . The governing party answers these questions in reference to its election platform, giving a partisan orientation to the policy goals, programs, and reforms to be implemented by civil servants. The implicit, normative assumption is that the governing party's policy choices and reforms are inherently correct and fully legitimate, thus potentially precluding ex ante assessments of their relevance, logic models, and evidence base.
For the next step in implementation, Barber advises politicians that they must achieve the four components of deliverology in order as follows: (1) de velop a foundation for delivery, (2) understand the delivery challenge, (3) plan for delivery, and (4) drive delivery (Barber et al., 2011a, p. 237) . Th e fi rst step involves reviewing the current state of delivery and creating a specialized results and delivery unit at the apex of power that leads delivery. Located deep inside the executive level of government, the delivery unit is far above Savoie's (2015) fault line in the current 90% range dedicated to policy ideas and communications. Although it does not invert the problematic "90/10" split, it does bring a strong mandate to pursue implementation relentlessly down the delivery chain to pro duce, monitor, and report on meaningful outcomes using metrics that citizens can see and understand (Barber, 2016; Barber et al., 2011a Barber et al., , 2011 Murekeyisoni, 2017 ) . This specialized delivery unit is to lead the way to cultural change in gov ernment and throughout delivery chains such that the institutional buzzwords become "ambition, focus, clarity, urgency and irreversibility" (Barber et al., 2011a; see pp. 31-33) .
The second step requires an assessment of past and present performance as well as the drivers of performance. Next, the government must proceed to estab lish a delivery plan comprising three key components: (1) the reform strategy, (2) the delivery chains, and (3) the targets and trajectories. The metrics must be clear, measurable, and meaningful to citizens and, especially, to politicians to help them "run a government" and usher in change efficiently. Finally, it is necessary to drive delivery by establishing routines for performance monitoring and problemsolving, and by maintaining the momentum. Thus, deliverology seems to address the bounded rationality problem of policymakers by proposing a simple plan: the relentless pursuit of a set of clear goals with the prioritization and tracking of key metrics and the delivery capacity to act quickly when needed.
Barber presented deliverology to the Canadian cabinet as a four-year pledgefulfillment strategy: "Set the agenda and develop the approach" and "show early wins" (year 1), "establish the delivery discipline across government" and "drive for results" (year 2), "continue drive for results" and "plan delivery of the next parlia ment's top priorities" (year 3), and "manage through to success and run-up to the election" (year 4) (see Barber, 2016 ; Canada School of Public Service, 2016a ). Journalists, commentators, and some academics tend to perceive deliverology as a pledge-fulfillment tool that helps the government to achieve measurable, concrete outcomes that respect election promises and keeps them accountable to citizens while improving governance through continuous monitoring of implementation (Arellano, 2016a (Arellano, , 2016b (Arellano, , 2016c Castonguay, 2016; Lahey, 2017; Murekeyisoni , 2017; Wells, 2016a; Wherry, 2016 Wherry, , 2017 Zilio, 2016) . Ironically, despite Barber's critique of short-term thinking and government by political communication, deliverology promotes a management and communication strategy that fi ts with the electoral logic of the permanent campaign in representative democracy, where governing parties are always preparing for, recovering from, and engaging in elec tions (Couture & Jacob, 2019) .
By defining the election promises as the deliverables and planning for their delivery over the electoral cycle, deliverology implicitly embraces the traditional model of electoral or democratic accountability known as promissory representa tion, whereby citizens grant a mandate to a political party to govern and hold the government accountable to keeping its election promises (Mansbridge, 2003) . Re search shows that, deliverology or not, the promise-keeping records at the federal level in Canada and provincially in Quebec are quite good (Pétry, 2014; Pétry & Birch, 2016 Pétry & Duval, 2015) . The governing party seeks to satisfy voter preferences expressed by the election results. Recent work examining the per formance of the Couillard government in Quebec (2014-2018) and the Trudeau government (2015-present) shows that while pledge fulfi llment is an important aspect of governance between elections, much legislative and policy action is not linked directly to election promises but rather to agenda-setting dynamics for new issues and policy-cycle dynamics for existing policies and programs (Jacob, Birch, Pétry, & Baby-Bouchard, 2018; Birch, Jacob & Baby-Bouchard, 2019) . Furthermore, in a pioneering study, Werner (2018 ) discovered that when given a choice between democratic representation models, fewer than one in ten re spondents preferred promissory representation through faithful promise keeping, while half chose the trustee or anticipatory model of governing for the common good (see also Mansbridge, 2003 , for a discussion of all representation models). Without a mutually exclusive choice between models (i.e., with separate questions about each model), respondents gave each representation model high importance rankings. Werner concludes that voters "want it all"-governing parties that are promise keepers and trustees of the common good and that show responsiveness to public opinion. In light of these findings regarding democratic accountability, it is necessary to ask what the value-added of deliverology is, as a way to imple ment election promises deemed to be of inherent worth, when governments are already quite good at promise keeping and when citizens may expect more than promise keeping.
HOW DOES DELIVEROLOGY COMPARE TO EVALUATION AND RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT?
On the surface, deliverology seems to include a form of monitoring or concomi tant evaluation (as opposed to ex ante or ex post evaluation), with its emphasis on tracking and targeting key metrics. These metrics are similar to results-based tar gets in public-sector management. Tweedie (2018 ) , a policy developer and strate gist in the government of Canada, argues that deliverology is really a rebranding of results-based management. Deliverology supports recourse to dashboards, but with a small set of specific targets deemed to be meaningful for citizens.
Both evaluation and deliverology share an ambition to ensure social betterment through the development, design, and implementation of effective policies and programs that yield meaningful outcomes. However, deliverology focuses on im plementing the governing party's vision of betterment via a delivery unit, while the multiple evaluation units dispersed throughout government agencies question the coherence between policy aims, implementation, and outcomes, their appro priateness, and the soundness of underlying logic models. As Table 1 shows, there are many substantive distinctions between the two worlds. Additional diff erences concern the vocabulary and scope of modern theory-based evaluations that at tend to both the intended and unintended outcomes, using a variety of qualitative and quantitiative data sources rather than a shortlist of key metrics.
WHAT ARE THE CRITICISMS OF DELIVEROLOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR EVALUATION AND EVIDENCE INFORMED POLICYMAKING?
Positive perspectives on deliverology start from Barber's claims that it enhances public-sector management, performance, and accountability to better serve citi zens, regardless of the conditions at the outset of adopting deliverology. Barber (2016 ) and Castonguay (2016 ) suggest that deliverology can alleviate taxpayer dissatisfaction and improve confidence in government. However, most of these claims are prospective opinions that have not been verified empirically through a rigourous independent evaluation process. 3 Robert Lahey (2017, p. 7), a Canadian evaluation expert and practitioner turned consultant, who was the founding head of Canada's Centre of Excellence for Evaluation, noted, "On the positive side, deliverology, given its link to political power, generally brings with it authority, resources, flexibility and a striving for provision of timely advice and quick turna round (i.e. a sense of urgency that can potentially cut through bureaucratic road blocks to action). "
In one of the rare independent case studies of the concept, Murekeyisoni (2017 ) finds positive effects in her assessment of deliverology applied to Ontario's education reform in the McGuinty years. She found that deliverology facilitated efficient management and coordination while ensuring a citizen-centered, resultsbased approach to educational reform. She further noted that it helped address re sistance to change in the delivery chain. However, this success refl ects adaptations of the deliverology model to engage actors collaboratively in defining goals and targets, rather than a standard top-down delivery pattern, and to grant fl exibility to actors to adapt to change.
Many negative criticisms situate deliverology as a variant of resultsbased management and refer to research findings about the pitfalls of the ap plication of private-sector-inspired reforms with performance targets in the public sector (Hood & Dixon, 2015a , 2015b Manning, 2015) . For example, de liverology is criticized for accentuating the hierarchical concentration of power within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), to the detriment of accountability Note. Information adapted from Barber et al. (2011a Barber et al. ( , 2011b , Canadian Evaluation Society (2014 ) mechanisms such as institutionalized evaluation in the public service and report ing to Parliament. Top-down command-and-control approaches tend to demoti vate public-service workers by failing to recognize their existing expertise and by considering them as obstacles to policy reform rather than partners in delivery. Empirical work analyzing 20 agencies operating with performance contracts in Quebec revealed that better outcomes arose when decision-authority and fi nancial controls were decentralized, not centralized (Aubert & Bourdeau, 2012) , which is in keeping with Murekeysoni's (2017) comments on the adaptations of deliverol ogy in Ontario. In contrast to Murekeysoni's and Barber's own claims about the effectiveness of deliverology for Ontario's education reforms, Sattler (2012 ) found that these education-governance reforms were rooted in a neoliberal accountabili ty and performance reform agenda starting in 1990 that was implemented through a long-term, incremental, and "messy" process, with no evaluation of the ultimate impact on outcomes for students. Furthermore, some UK case studies also suggest a continuum with pre-existing new public management reforms and expose the lim its to deliverology due to short-sighted targets, missed delivery problems, the com plexity of policy implementation, and the challenges of changing organizations and target population behaviors in durable ways (Smith, Richards, Geddes, & Mathers, 2011; Smithers, 2001) .
A second line of criticism concerns the targets themselves, pressures to reach targets, and unintended, perverse, or short-lived effects. When targets lack legiti macy among practitioners, focus on a narrow set of metrics to the exclusion of others, and include mixed incentives attached to employee performance assess ment or to program funding, they can undermine results and outcomes, yielding perverse, unintended results by demotivating and devaluing practitioners, creat ing a climate of fear about the consequences of missing targets, and by placing them in ethical dilemmas (Arnaboldi, Lapsley, & Steccolini, 2015; Ayers, 2013; Jacob, 2009a Jacob, , 2009b Jacob, Miller-Pelletier, & Birch, 2017; Murekeyisoni, 2017; Poister, 2003) . By focusing on chosen metrics, deliverology may sacrifice the sys tematic analysis of unintended, even perverse consequences that will arise if ac tors down the delivery chain find incentives to "present selective data, " "game the metrics, " and "distort or manipulate the findings" (Bevan, 2012; Bevan & Hood, 2006; Fisher & Downes, 2008; Hood, 2006 Hood, , 2010 Hood, , 2012 Schacter, 2002a Schacter, , 2002b Schacter, , 2006 Schacter, , 2011 Schacter, , 2016 Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014 ) . The harshest and most sarcastic criti cism of deliverology comes from John Seddon (2008 Seddon ( , 2013 , who argues using examples from deliverology under the Blair government that it is an oversimpli fied form of "Mickey Mouse command and control" that believes in "reform by targets" but misses the desired policy outcomes. He concludes that deliverology results in a dysfunctional, distorted system where demoralized, cynical service providers "manage all the wrong things, " by focusing on costs rather than values and on gaming targets rather than achieving higher outcomes, which leads to increased costs to support gaming strategies, with perverse eff ects on outcomes especially in the health-care and education sectors (see CFA Local 1983 [2010a , 2010b for videos of Seddon's speeches condemning deliverology). To the extent that deliverology is "old wine in a new bottle, " these problems with results-based approaches are relevant.
Another consequence of results-based approaches is the trend toward using evaluation expertise in Canadian public administration to develop, track, and report on a limited set of metrics, which diminishes the time and resources al located to conducting all-encompassing evaluations that ensure accountability and learning for outcomes and do not just target achievements and reporting up the internal hierarchy (Savoie, 2015) . Politically driven and externally oriented accountability mechanisms embedded in performance regimes seem to miss the mark for measuring performance and for creating positive incentive systems for enchanced service delivery and policy learning, especially when policies entail complex tasks that are difficult to capture in a limited range of indicators (Jakob sen, Baekgaard, Moynihan, & van Loon, 2018) . Already, without the addition of deliverology, this narrow approach undermines the role and production of ex post evaluations as a tool for policy learning and improving outcomes (Shep herd, 2018) . When delivery units are created within departments in parallel with existing audit and evaluations departments, multiple tensions arise between the functions of delivery, auditing, and evaluation. Delivery units, because of their direct links to the PCO and their preoccupation with results indicators, further institutionalize a form of new political governance that may squeeze audit and evaluation functions. For civil servants, ethical tensions can emerge between the public-sector ethos of neutrality and the perceived partisan prerogatives of deliv ery units, especially when the line between public service in the government and public service under the governing party becomes fuzzy.
Furthermore, deliverology targets are more limited in range and depth than the indicators of program relevance, effectiveness, and outcomes that evaluators would choose or that may be meaningful to citizens. When deliverology targets are met while other more significant indicators are not, this may actually under mine legitimacy, as citizens perceive a gap between the successful attainment of a target and their own experiences as the beneficiaries of a public service. When the broader range of evaluation criteria and indicators is ignored, it is likely to take more time and be more tedious to improve delivery, benefi ciary satisfaction, and desired long-term outcomes. Although command-and-control approaches to delivery may yield short-term results, long-term change requires modifi cations in organizational culture and behaviour. This may stall as the next election nears be cause the delivery concerns of politicians metamorphose into a focus on the cam paign ahead, and those of civil servants anticipate those of the next government.
Although Barber recognizes the growing criticism of the eff ectiveness of delivery units, given their variable results, his response is as follows:
This critique is important, but is not completely fair, as the idea of a Delivery Unit has become a victim of its own success. When something is fashionable, lots of people rush to do it, and so impact inevitably varies. As a result, many Delivery Units have the label, but not much else. They belong to a large and growing group of "DINOs"-Delivery Units in Name Only. (Delivery Associates, n.d.b) A third line of criticism tackles the question of the value-added of deliverol ogy from the perspective of the practitioners of public policy, management, and evaluation as well as of scholars and students of public policy and management. Essentially, deliverology just repackages old ideas, especially but not exclusively about performance management. Many of these ideas, which are standard fare in introductory "101" courses on public policy, administration, or project manage ment, are portrayed as innovative ones by advocates of deliverology. Th is repack aging is well illustrated in two reports by the Centre for Public Impact, which is co-chaired by Michael Barber, namely "The Public Impact Fundamentals Report: Helping Governments Progress from Idea to Impact" (2016 ) and "A Rubric for Assessing Public Impact: Applying the Public Fundamentals to the Real World" (2017 ). These reports present a self-proclaimed "new maximization framework" to close the gap between what governments achieve for their citizens and what they could deliver, a "checklist for practitioners" based on the three public funda mentals (legitimacy, policy, and action), and a rubric for determining what sourc es of information (such as organization publications, initiative blueprint, initiative implementation plan, speeches from politicians, party manifestos, and public opinion research, plus articles, case studies, and reports) are needed to evaluate the fundamentals. The promotion of these simple, repackaged frameworks and checklists as "new" to professionals who have been applying them and more for some time in their departments errs by ignoring their pre-existing knowledge and expertise. This can foster cynicism and demotivation rather than enthusiasm for the government's reform agenda. This is more likely when civil servants perceive delivery units as restructuring the space for policy conversations and the roles of existing internal accountability units to their disadvantage or perceive new con flicts between goals, short-sighted targets, and outcomes. Furthermore, according to Jakobsen et al. (2018 ) , external accountability regimes (of which deliverology is one) that are not grounded scientifically and empirically tend to "crowd out, " rather than stimulate, the intrinsic motivation of service providers because of mis matched external incentives and performance indicators, weak consideration of the complexity of policy tasks, and implicit disregard of the importance of intrin sically motivated, autonomous professionals in service management and delivery.
Finally, one may ask whether the "old wine in new bottles" remains, nonethe less, of timeless relevancy or is past its expiry date. This is a question that those who have been promoting the deliverology model relentlessly since the Blair years do not seem to entertain. By contrast, this is the quintessential question for evalu ators, public administration scholars, and political scientists. Th eir theoretical reflections, empirical research, and practitioner experiences regarding resultsbased management, its organizational and whole-of-government impact, and its relationship to evaluation have supported a trend favoring "new wine in new bot tles. " This trend goes beyond earlier, simplified, top-down approaches to resultsbased management to recognize the importance of dialogues between those who make the policy decisions and those who assure implementation. Th ese dialogues involve conversations between agents and principals about performance, the interface between performance management and evaluation, designing perfor mance systems to encourage organizational learning and effectiveness, policy task complexity, the appropriate indicators, employee motivation, incentive mecha nisms as an antidote to cynicism, and the optimal conditions for policy as well as organizational learning (e.g., Jakobsen et al., 2018; Laihonen & Mäntylä, 2017; Moynihan, 2005 Moynihan, , 2008a Moynihan, , 2008b Moynihan, , 2010 .
WHAT ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIVEROLOGY IN CANADA?
Deliverology, like any public management reform, is never implemented in a vac uum. For this reason, let us begin by establishing the context in which it came to Canada through a brief review of historical developments in Canadian public policy and administration. From the 1970s onward, Canada began experimenting with results-based approaches. The country undertook yet another initiative 4 on "re thinking government" in the mid-1990s and implemented routines for evaluation, results-based management, regulatory impact assessment, citizen engagement and consultation, stakeholder participation, the production and use of public opinion research, evaluation, and scientific evidence in policy. Although some of these routines were under pressure during the Harper years, they did not disappear from the public-sector landscape. Rather, the Canadian state honed and fi ne-tuned the infrastructure for monitoring and evaluation and the requirements for the utiliza tion of evaluation results that were instituted with the Treasury Board's Results for Canadians in 2000 and reinforced with mandatory performance frameworks at the program and organizational levels (Lahey, 2017; Lahey & Nielsen, 2013 : Shepherd, 2018 . Since 2013, long before deliverology and the mandate letter tracker, the Treasury Board already published online the GC InfoBase, which tracks a variety of indicators and government results (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, n.d.) . Th e 2009 Evaluation Policy (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2009) that was replaced by the Policy on Results (Canada, Treasury Board Secretariat, 2010) already talked about producing timely, neutral evaluation evidence and managing for results.
In many ways, Canadian public servants have been working within resultsbased management and accountability frameworks since the 1970s, long before the Trudeau government contracted Barber's services (Curran, 2016; Lahey, 2017; Lahey & Nielsen, 2013; Tweedie, 2018) . In fact, Tweedie (2018 ) 
asserts,
We are open, accountable, and transparent. We use plain language and consult with our stakeholders. We have strategic plans, operational plans and implementation plans. We use SMART indicators and ensure that relevance and performance (value for money) drive our organisations to deliver results of benefit to Canadians. We do risk assessments, audits, and evaluations according to clear, published criteria. Mod ern public policy governance? Nailed it.
However, both Tweedie (2018 ) and Savoie (2015) point out that the Auditor Gen eral of Canada remains critical of public services where the implementation of the results-based approach resulted in agencies focusing on internal accountability chains, thus neglecting the citizens' perspective and the unintended consequences of the policy in their performance reports (Auditor General of Canada, 2002 , 2004 , 2005 . Lahey and Nielsen (2013 ) also note that the Auditor General supports monitoring and evaluation practices and uptake and frequently calls for more substantive evaluation of overall program effectiveness and quality of results. They also recognize the persistent diffi culties the Canadian system ex periences in "establishing the right balance" (p. 49) between using performance measurement from monitoring and evaluation for accountability versus policy learning. Given this historical backdrop, deliverology, with its focus on deliver ing the governing party's agenda and on defining success in terms of reaching targets, may well exacerbate these difficulties by reinforcing this pre-existing trend to favour performance measurement use for control rather than for improving operations through policy learning. Let us now turn to the implementation of deliverology in Canada at the federal level.
On December 23, 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau named Matthew Mendel sohn, former advisor and deputy minister in Ontario's McGuinty government, as Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Results and Delivery) in the Privy Council Offi ce. At the first Liberal cabinet retreat in St. Andrews, New Brunswick, in January 2016, deliverology officially appeared on the federal political landscape (Dyer, 2016a) . Sir Michael Barber from Delivery Associates, under contract for two years at $217,000 (Castonguay, 2016) , Dominic Barton, CEO from McKinsey Consulting, working pro bono (Geddes, 2016) , and their ideas became special guests at this meeting and at subsequent federal cabinet retreats in Kananaskis, Alberta (April 2016), Sudbury, Ontario (August 2016), St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador (September 2017), and London, Ontario (January 2018). Through the Results and Delivery Unit in the Privy Council Office, Barber's ideas became embedded in the Trudeau govern ment, which created a cabinet committee on "Agenda and Results, " chaired by the Prime Minister, which would become the "Agenda, Results and Communication" committee by August 2016 (Wells, 2016b) (Canada, Privy Council Offi ce, 2018a , 2018b MacCharles, 2017) . In January 2018, Matthew Mendelsohn, head of Canada's delivery unit, presented deliverology as a "data-driven, results-focused approach" to public-sector management that included a space for evidence and evaluation, despite the challenges of "obtaining timely data for metrics on pledge fulfillment" (Mendelsohn, as interviewed by Haws, 2018) . He seems to suggest that the value-added of the Mandate Tracker is to provide greater transparency about pledge tracking, a task that previous governments did behind closed doors, and to focus executive-level attention on implementation through "ongoing evalu ation" as opposed to conventional ex post evaluations. In contrast, political scien tists express serious concerns that deliverology encourages deeper centralization at the executive level with special communication channels and additional re sources for delivery units (Alex Marland and Anna Esselment, as interviewed by Ryckewaert, 2016) .
From the start, the Canadian media responded to these developments in federal governance with skepticism, calling Barber a "guru" (Arellano, 2016c; Dyer, 2016b; McGregor, 2016) , the Prime Minister a "devotee" (Wherry, 2016) , and deliverology as the latest "fad and fashion" (French, 2016) or a "punchline" (Radwanski, 2017) , with growing criticism (Wherry, 2017 ) that switched to sar casm when denied an interview with Barber on broken election promises and the use of "deliverology for relentless implementation" (Bimman, 2018) . Responding to an article in L'Actualité (Castonguay, 2016) , the Canadian Evaluation Society reminded readers of the 40 years of evaluation practice in Canada and the insti tutionalization of evaluation in the federal administration starting in 1977 (Cum mings & Gauthier, 2016) . At a press conference to release fall reports, Michael Ferguson, the Auditor General of Canada (2017 ), signalled that there is a delivery gap between the whole-of-government level and its messages about citizen-centric service delivery. When queried about the mandate tracker, Ferguson remarked that the limited scope of the mandate tracker with its focus on election promises missed the fact that "there's more to government than big-talk mandate letters for ministers" (as cited by Delacourt, 2017) . In many ways, the "Mandate Letter Tracker" website seems to be a new tool for political communications and packag ing the government's progress (or lack of progress) toward achieving its election commitments as reformulated and adjusted in the mandate letters. 5 The arrival of deliverology in Canada sparked a friendly debate between Mark Schacter (2016 ), an Ottawa-based consultant and author of a critical essay entitled "Does 'Deliverology' Matter?, " and Steve Montague (2016 ) , an adjunct professor and consultant who offered "A Response to Does 'Deliverology' Mat ter?: Targets Can Work If Done Properly. " Although Montague recognized many of Schacter's criticisms, he expressed reservations about skepticism toward tar gets. He argued for the " responsible" development and management of targets over the longer policy cycle in an iterative process that engages stakeholders and decision makers and contributes to policy learning. Th us, Montague implicitly embraced the "new wine" approach based on performance dialogues for learning and explicitly hoped that the Canadian brand of deliverology would engage in " responsible" targeting.
CONCLUSION
This tale of two worlds traces the portrait of deliverology as a business and a model of implementation that repackages and rebrands old ideas linked to results-based management and democratic accountability as pledge fulfillment, while assuming that current governance systems are not delivering and therefore need a deliverol ogy fix. It questions the innovativeness of deliverology generally and highlights some criticisms of this model, especially regarding the possibility that deliverol ogy may usurp evaluative capacity. It finds limited value-added, since recourse to deliverology in Canada ignores both the strong record of pledge fulfi llment and the particularities of Canada's complex multi-level governance context. Although deliverology does bring a focus on implementation to the apex of power, its relevance and effectiveness seem somewhat elusive in a context where the state has already institutionalized evaluation and results-based approaches and where new political governance undermines frontline delivery capacity via the inverted "90/10" split. Th e effectiveness of deliverology as a "way to run a government" has never been subjected to an independent, whole-of-government evaluation, and, if it were, it would be difficult to disentangle outcomes owing to deliverol ogy from those owing to other factors in a context of institutionalized evaluation and monitoring systems. Originally a "tongue-in-cheek" term coined by Barber's critics (The Economist, 2015) , deliverology became Barber's globalized consulting enterprise. Barber's deliverology has an aura of scientificity because of recourse to target metrics, and an appealing message because of its practical, business-like approach to complex governance challenges associated with public sector reforms.
Deliverology is light on science and heavy on narrative, with fl exible evidence standards that favour "best practice stories" and narrower "targeted metrics, " whereas evaluation and social research are science heavy and narrative light, with stricter evidence standards, assessment criteria, and multiple metric points tai lored to specific purposes. Each world has its own value orientation. Barber relies on business-inspired thinking about running a government that inherently values private-sector performance management. His model is shaped by the ideological orientations of the self-proclaimed, "small 'l' liberal" and "centre-right" think tanks and organizations that Barber refers to in his works. By contrast, evalua tors and policy researchers are grounded in scientific thinking, leading them to value systematic recourse to theories, research methods, and empirical fi ndings to address policy questions, to assess implementation outcomes, and to determine the effects of programs and policies, as compared to the "counterfactual"-that is, what would have occurred had the policy or program not been implemented, or if they had been implemented diff erently. To them, many of Barber's sources are "grey literature. " To Barber, the work of evaluators and policy scientists is too abstract and lacks synthesis. He cares about helping governments to deliver their election promises and reforms, whatever they may be, abstracted from any critical analysis of the reform agenda itself, the need for structural change within the public administration system, or the current pledge-delivery capacity of the system. By contrast, evaluators and political scientists care about the relevancy, appropriateness, and impact of such reforms-that is, their ability to achieve socially desirable outcomes with target populations in meaningful, cost-eff ective ways, and their ability to enhance public management and service delivery. Where evaluators aspire to facilitate conversations about "good" commitments and out come congruence with policy goals, "deliverologists" assume party commitments are "good" and seek conversations about implementation and progress toward achieving set targets.
Perhaps Barber can learn from evaluators, public administration scholars, and political scientists about the importance of context, evidence of the perverse effects of governance by targets, evidence of the failures of private-sector-inspired reforms on public-sector capacity and employee motivation, and, most important, the role of more comprehensive evaluations of reforms, programs, and policies in deep policy learning and delivery of better outcomes. If nothing else, perhaps evaluators, public administration scholars, and political scientists should take note of the importance of "storytelling" and "packaging" as a mode of knowledge diffusion for uptake by policymakers. Barber's success in global networking to diffuse his "Deliverology®" model shows that storytelling about the eff ectiveness of this governance model, even without solid, science-based evidence, is more appealing to policymakers who say they support "evidence-informed" policy and management but who struggle with bounded rationality in complex, challenging policy environments. cent. " Oddly, neither Savoie nor Barber references the other's work, nor do they reference similar literature, despite their shared diagnostic of the 90/10 split and their criticism of the short-sightedness of "government by political communications. " 2 The exception is a reference to Osbourne and Gaebler's famous book Reinventing Gov ernment: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (1993), which emphasizes market-oriented, results-oriented governments that "steer" rather than "row. " 3 We began our research eff orts and analysis of "deliverology" in 2016 at the same time as others (see Richards, 2018; Richards et al., 2017; Schacter, 2016) . Our fi ndings cor roborate one another's. We add that much of the positive literature on "deliverology" in cyberspace is linked to Barber or to one of the consulting firms with which he is or was associated. 4 Since the Glassco commission of 1962-63, the Canadian government has experienced multiple iterative processes that have led to the institutionalization of evaluation and shifts toward evidence-based decision making. 5 Governing parties in Canada have used similar tools to track their promise delivery, without calling it "deliverology. " See the Campbell government's "Five Great Goals for a Golden Decade" in B.C., the Stelmach government's "Measuring Up: Progress Report on the Business Plan of the Alberta Government, " the Charest government's short-lived tracking tool or the traffic light system of the Marois government in Quebec, and the federal government's "Departmental Results Framework and Inventory Program. "
